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Abstract
In traditional mathematical models of argumentation an argument often consists of a chain of rules or reasons, beginning with
premisses and leading to a conclusion that is endorsed by the party that put forward the argument. In informal reasoning, however,
one often encounters a specific class of counterarguments that until now has received little attention in argumentation formalisms.
The idea is that instead of starting with the premisses, the argument starts with the propositions put forward by the counterparty,
of which the absurdity is illustrated by showing their (defeasible) consequences. This way of argumentation (which we call S-
arguments) is very akin to Socratic dialogues and critical interviews; it also has applications in modern philosophy. In this paper,
various examples of S-arguments are provided, as well as a treatment of the problems that occur when trying to formalize them
in existing formalisms. We also provide general guidelines that can serve as a basis for implementing S-arguments into various
existing formalisms. In particular, we show how S-arguments can be implemented in Pollock’s formalism, how they fit into Dung’s
abstract argumentation approach and how they are related to the issue of self-defeating arguments.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Over the last few years, many formalisms for defeasible argumentation have been defined. In some approaches, like
[7], the internal structure of the arguments is left abstract. In other approaches arguments consist of sets of assumptions
[2,3], of lists [20,24] or of trees [27]. In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to approaches that represent arguments
as lists or trees.
Argumentation can also be seen from a dialectical perspective. A relatively straightforward approach is the
argument-games as described by Prakken and Sartor [20], Prakken and Vreeswijk [25], or Dunne and Bench-Capon
[6]. In these approaches, argumentation takes place between two agents—a proponent and an opponent—who take
turns in putting forward arguments. A thus played argumentation game can essentially serve as a proof theory for the
underlying Dung-style semantics of the argumentation formalism.
There exists a close connection between argumentation in its dialectical form (like [1,25]) and persuasion dialogues
(like [10,28]). The main difference is that in an argument dialectical game, each argument is given as a whole, whereas
in a dialogue game an argument can also gradually be “rolled off”. Instead of stating the entire argument at once, one
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reasons, until the point is reached where the reasons are no longer disputed—for instance when one has reached the
set of shared premisses. The connection between argumentation and dialogue has been explored by Prakken [19].
Although our main interest is in argumentation, we will sometimes use the field of dialogue in order to illustrate
specific concepts or intuitions.
One of the advantages of applying argumentation instead of (nonmonotonic) logic in general is that argumenta-
tion comes closer to how people actually reason. This is especially true if argumentation is seen from a dialectical
perspective [20,25]. An interesting question, therefore, is to which extent the current generation of argumentation for-
malisms is able to capture the richness of human argumentation. That is, does the current generation of argumentation
formalisms support the various types of arguments used in informal argumentation?
In this paper, we provide a treatment of one specific type of informal argument—a type that has been applied
practically since antiquity—and show that this type of argument cannot properly be represented by many of today’s
argumentation formalisms (we have chosen Pollock’s formalism as an example). We then provide a conceptual analy-
sis of this specific type of informal reasoning and specify how to adjust existing tree and list based argumentation
formalisms (for which we again have chosen Pollock’s formalism as an example) to properly implement it.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 (Socratic-style arguments) we provide an overview of the informal
argument form under discussion and show its various applications. In Section 3 (Pollock’s argumentation formalism)
we identify some problems that occur when one tries to apply this kind of arguments in today’s generation of list
and tree based argumentation formalisms, for which we have chosen Pollock’s formalism as an example. In Section 4
(Analysis) an analysis is provided of the concepts that are related to the argument form under discussion. In Section 5
(Formalization) we show how the argument form can be included in Pollock’s argumentation formalism. The seman-
tical issues are dealt with in Section 6. In Section 7 it is discussed how our particular argument form can deal with
some subtle issues regarding self-defeat. The discussion is rounded off in Section 8.
2. Socratic-style arguments
Many formalisms of argumentation (such as [18,20,26]) regard an argument as a structured chain of rules. An
argument usually begins with one or more premises—statements that are simply regarded as true by all involved
parties, such as directly observable facts. After this follows the repeated application of various rules, which generate
new conclusions and therefore enable the application of additional rules. An example of such an argument is as
follows:
“Sjaak probably went to the soccer game, since people claim his car was parked nearby the stadium, and Sjaak is
known to be a soccer fan.”
claimed(car_at_stadium), soccer_ fan,
claimed(car_at_stadium) ⇒ car_at_stadium,
car_at_stadium ∧ soccer_ fan ⇒ at_ game
Arguments are often defeasible, meaning that the argument by itself is not a conclusive reason for the conclusions
it brings about. Whether or not an argument should be accepted depends on its possible counterarguments. For the
above argument, a possible counterargument could be:
“Sjaak did not go to the soccer game, since his friends claim he was watching the game with them in a bar.”
friends_claim(at_bar),
friends_claim(at_bar) ⇒ at_bar,
at_bar → ¬at_ game
The issue of determining the arguments and conclusions that are considered to be justified then becomes a matter of
weighing and evaluating the given arguments.
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argument is ultimately (directly or indirectly) based on premises only. In human argumentation, however, one can
often observe arguments which are not based on premises only, but which are instead at least partly based on the
conclusions of the other person’s argument. As an illustration, consider the following example of a discussion between
the opponent and proponent of a certain thesis:
P: “Guus did not go to the game because his mobile phone record shows he was in his mother’s house at the time
of the game.”
phone_record,
phone_record ⇒ at_mothers_house(phone),
at_mothers_house(phone) ⇒ at_mothers_house(Guus),
at_mothers_house(Guus) → ¬at_ game(Guus)
O: “Then he would not have watched the game at all, since his mother’s TV has been broken for quite a while.
Don’t you think that’s a little odd? Guus is known to be a soccer fan and would definitely have watched the
game.”
soccer_ fan(Guus),
at_mothers_house(Guus) ⇒ ¬watch_ game(Guus),
soccer_ fan(Guus) ⇒ watch_ game(Guus)
Here, the opponent takes the propositions as uttered by the proponent as a starting point and then uses these to
(defeasibly) derive a contradiction, thus illustrating the (implicit) absurdity of the proponent’s original argument.
2.1. Socrates and the elenchus
The idea of taking the other party’s opinion and then deriving a contradiction (or something else that is undesirable
to the other party) is not new. One of the first well known examples of this style of reasoning can be found in the
philosophy of Socrates, as written down by Plato. Socrates’s form of reasoning—also called the elenchus—consists
of letting the opponent make a statement, and then taking this statement as a starting point to derive more statements,
each of which is committed by the opponent. The ultimate aim is to let the opponent commit himself to a contradic-
tion, which shows that the beliefs the opponent uttered in the dialogue cannot hold together and should therefore be
rejected.
As an example of how Socrates’s form of dialectical reasoning worked, consider the following dialogue, in which
Socrates questions Menexenus about the nature of friendship [14, pp. 212–213]
(. . . ) Answer me this. As soon as one man loves another, which of the two becomes the friend? the lover of the
loved, or the loved of the lover? Or does it make no difference?
None in the world, that I can see, he replied.
How? said I; are both friends, if only one loves?
I think so, he answered.
Indeed! is it not possible for one who loves, not to be loved in return by the object of his love?
It is.
Nay, is it not possible for him even to be hated? treatment, if I mistake not, which lovers frequently fancy they
receive at the hands of their favorites. Though they love their darlings as dearly as possible, they often imagine that
they are not loved in return, often that they are even hated. Don’t you believe this to be true?
Quite true, he replied.
Well, in such a case as this, the one loves, the other is loved.
Just so.
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and even if he be hated, or the loved of the lover? or is neither the friend of he other, unless both love each
other?
The latter certainly seems to be the case, Socrates.
If so, I continued, we think differently now from what we did before. Then it appeared that if one loved, both
were friends; but now, that unless both love, neither are friends.
Yes, I’m afraid we have contradicted ourselves.
Socrates’s method is that of asking questions. The questions, however, are often meant to direct the dialogue partner
into a certain direction. It is the questions that force the dialogue partner to make certain inferences, as these seem to
logically follow from the dialogue partner’s own position. The inferences are not deductive, as they are usually based
on common sense and what is reasonable. The inference is therefore more of a defeasible than of a strict nature.
Socrates’s elenchus is not meant for the derivation of new facts. On the contrary, its purpose is primarily destructive,
meant to destroy someone’s pretension of knowledge [11]. In “The Sophist”, Plato provides the following definition
of the elenchus [13]:
They [those that apply the elenchus] cross-examine a man’s words, when he thinks that he is saying something and
is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the
dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things,
in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle
towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way that is most amusing
to the hearer, and produces the most lasting effect to the person who is the subject of the operation.
The destruction of knowledge is best pursued by showing it to be incompatible with other knowledge, as argued by
the Belgian scholar Chaïm Perelman [12, p. 24]:
How do we disqualify a fact or truth? The most effective way is to show its incompatibility with other facts and
truths which are more certainly established, preferably with a bundle of facts and truths which we are not willing
to abandon.
Of course, an obvious way to show incompatibility is by means of a classical counterargument, but there are also
forms of incompatibility that require argumentation beyond classical arguments.
2.2. Some modern examples
The kind of reasoning in which one confronts the other party with the (defeasible) consequences of its statements is
still widely used in modern times. Consider the following dialogue between politician P and interviewing journalist J:
P: In two years time, the waiting lists in health care will be as good as resolved.
J: Then you are actually saying that the insurance fees will be increased, because the government has already
decided not to put more money into the health care system, and you have promised not to lower the
coverage of the standard insurance.
In general, one may say that many of today’s interviews in which the interviewer takes a critical stance, the interviewer
tries to force the interviewee to draw conclusions or make statements that the interviewee may wish to avoid.
On a more philosophical level, James Skidmore discusses the issue of transcendental arguments, which are meant
to combat various forms of (philosophical) scepticism. The aim of a transcendental argument is “to locate something
that the sceptic must presuppose in order for her challenge to be meaningful, then to show that from this presupposition
it follows that the skeptic’s challenge can be dismissed.” [23, p. 121] Skidmore gives various (rather long) examples
of these kind of arguments—we will not repeat them here.
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modern times, both in popular as well as in philosophical argumentation. It is our opinion that therefore the question
of how these arguments can be formally modelled is a relevant one.
3. Pollock’s argumentation formalism
In this section, we examine the problems that one encounters when trying to apply Socratic-style arguments (S-
arguments) using today’s formalisms for defeasible reasoning. The main focus of this section is on the argumentation
formalism of John Pollock [15,17,18]. We have chosen Pollock’s formalism because it is well-known and is rich
enough to deal with rebutting and undercutting defeaters, as well as with differences in rule-strength. Nevertheless,
the problems that are discussed in this section also play a role in other formalisms (like default logic [22] and the
formalism of Prakken and Sartor [20]), as explained in [4]. During his years of research, Pollock has produced different
versions of his formalism. In this thesis, we focus on two of these versions:
• the one based on grounded semantics [15,17] (Section 3.1);
• the one resulting from an analysis of self-defeating arguments [18] (Section 3.3).
We start with a summary of Pollock’s grounded semantics based system. Notice that this summary is partly based on
the Handbook of Philosophical Logic [21].
3.1. Pollock’s grounded semantics based system
In the system of Pollock, arguments are constructed by means of reasons. Pollock distinguishes two kinds of
reasons: conclusive and prima facie.
Conclusive reasons are reasons that logically entail their conclusions. A conclusive reason is any valid form of first
order deduction. The following are examples of conclusive reasons.
{p,p ⊃ q} is a conclusive reason for q
{∃x : Px} is a conclusive reason for ¬∀x : ¬Px
Prima facie reasons, at the other hand, are not necessarily valid in first order logic; they only create a presumption
in favor of their conclusion. This presumption can be defeated by other reasons, depending on the strength of the
conflicting reasons. Pollock distinguishes several kinds of prima facie reasons, for instance principles of perception,
such as:
x appears to me as Y 	 is a prima facie reason for believing x is Y 	
Notice that .	 stands for the objectification operator. With this operator, expressions in the meta-language are trans-
lated into expressions in the object-language.
Another general source of prima facie reasons is the statistical syllogism:
If (r > 0.5) then x is an F and prob(G/F) = r	 is a prima facie reason of strength r for believing x is a G	.
Other sources of prima facie reasons are also available [18].
Pollock’s notion of an argument is made formal in the following definition (taken from [21]) which is essentially
an argument-based interpretation of [18].
Definition 1. Let INPUT be a consistent set of first-order formulas. An argument based on INPUT is a finite sequence
σ1, . . . , σn, where each σi is a line of argument. A line of argument σi is a triple 〈Xi,pi, νi〉, where Xi , a set of
propositions, is the set of suppositions of σi , pi is a proposition, and νi is the degree of justification of σi . A new
line of argument is obtained from the earlier lines of argument according to one of the following rules of argument
formation.
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Reason. If σ is an argument, 〈X1,p1, η1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn, ηn〉 are members of σ , and {p1, . . . , pn} is a reason of strength
ν for q , and for each i,Xi ⊆ X, then σ, 〈X,q,min{η1, . . . , ηn, ν}〉 is an argument.
Supposition. If σ is an argument, X a set of propositions and p ∈ X, then σ, 〈X,p,∞〉 is also an argument.
Conditionalization. If σ is an argument and some line of σ is 〈X ∪ {p}, q, ν〉, then σ, 〈X, (p ⊃ q), ν〉 is also an
argument.
Dilemma. If σ is an argument and some line of σ is 〈X,p ∨ q, ν〉, and some line of σ is 〈X ∪ {p}, r,μ〉, and some
line of σ is 〈X ∪ {q}, r, ξ 〉, then σ, 〈X,r,min{ν,μ, ξ}〉 is also an argument.
Pollock [18] notes that other inference rules could be added as well.
The addition of argument formation rules like supposition, conditionalization and dilemma makes it possible to
construct suppositional arguments, in addition to linear arguments. The idea of suppositional reasoning is to “suppose”
something that is not derived from other information, draw conclusions from it, and then “discharge” the supposition
to obtain a conclusion that no longer depends on the supposition. The way in which Pollock’s system deals with
suppositional reasoning is very similar to the use of assumptions in natural deduction. As a result of this, each line of
inference contains an associated set of suppositions.
Pollock’s formalism is one of the very few nonmonotonic logics that allow for suppositional reasoning. An example
of the usefulness of suppositional arguments is that it enables “reasoning by cases”, which is left unsupported in
most other logics for nonmonotonic reasoning. For instance, if Dutch people usually like ice-skating, Norwegian
people usually like ice-skating, and Sven is either Dutch or Norwegian, then it seems a reasonable conclusion that,
presumably, Sven likes ice-skating.
Suppositional reasoning, however, is outside of the scope of the current paper, which mainly focusses on linear
(non-suppositional) arguments. An example of such an argument is the following.
INPUT= {kiss(Mary,John),looks_cold(Mary)}
PFREASONS= {looks_cold(X) ⇒0.8 has_cold(X),
kiss(X,Y) ∧ has_cold(X) ⇒0.6 contaminated(X)}
1. 〈∅,looks_cold(Mary),∞〉 (INPUT)
2. 〈∅,has_cold(Mary),0.8〉 (1, first prima facie reason)
3. 〈∅,kiss(Mary,John),∞〉 (INPUT)
4. 〈∅,has_cold(Mary) ∧ kiss(Mary,John),0.8〉 (2, 3 conclusive reason)
5. 〈∅,contaminated(John),0.6〉 (4, second prima facie reason)
Throughout this paper, we will make use of many examples in order to illustrate concepts and potential problems.
In order to keep the treatment concise, we hereby introduce an abbreviated notation for Pollock-style arguments.
The main idea is to represent an argument as a chained sequence of reasons, instead of a “natural deduction style”
derivation. The above argument can be represented as follows.
looks_cold(Mary)∞, looks_cold(Mary)∞ ⇒0.8 has_cold(Mary)0.8, kiss(Mary,John)∞,
kiss(Mary,John)∞, has_cold(Mary)0.8 → (kiss(Mary,John) ∧ has_cold(Mary))0.8,
(kiss(Mary,John) ∧ has_cold(Mary))0.8 ⇒0.6 contaminated(John)0.6
The above notation is a condensed version of the natural deduction style notation. A line obtained by applying a
reason is represented by the respective reason (where “⇒” stands for prima facie reasons and “→” for conclusive
reasons). Lines containing statements from INPUT are represented simply by the respective INPUT-statement. In
order to keep the treatment concise, we often omit strict reasons that only build a conjunction of their premisses.
Strengths of statements and prima facie reasons are omitted iff every prima facie reason has the same strength. Notice
that our abbreviated argument-notation is not automatically suitable to represent suppositional reasoning. For our
limited purposes, however, it will do.
Now that the notion of an argument has been explained, we can continue with Pollock’s definition of defeat. For
now, we use Pollock’s old version of defeat [17], as this is relatively simple to deal with. Although Pollock sometimes
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Vreeswijk [21].
Definition 2 (rebut). An argument σ rebuts an argument η iff:
(1) η contains a line of the form 〈X,q,α〉 that is obtained by the argument formation rule Reason from some earlier
lines 〈X1,p1, α1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn,αn〉 where {p1, . . . , pn} is a prima facie reason for q , and
(2) σ contains a line of the form 〈Y,¬q,β〉 where X ⊆ Y and β  α.
Definition 3 (undercut). An argument σ undercuts an argument η iff:
(1) η contains a line of the form 〈X,q,α〉 that is obtained by the argument formation rule Reason from some earlier
lines 〈X1,p1, α1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn,αn〉 where {p1, . . . , pn} is a prima facie reason for q , and
(2) σ contains a line of the form 〈Y,¬{p1, . . . , pn} → q	, β〉 where Y ⊆ X and β  α.
In the above definition {p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	 is a translation of “{p1, . . . , pn} is a prima facie reason for q” into the
object language.
Definition 4 (defeat). An argument σ defeats an argument η iff σ rebuts or undercuts η.
Regarding justified arguments, Pollock uses the following inductive definition [15].
Definition 5. [15]
• All non-selfdefeating arguments are in at level 0.
• An argument is in at level n + 1 (n > 0) iff it is in at level 0 and it is not defeated by any argument that is in at
level n.
• An argument is justified iff there is an m such that for every nm the argument is in at level n.
If self-defeating arguments are not taken into consideration then this definition is, as shown by Dung, equivalent
to the definition of grounded semantics [7] under the condition that every argument is defeated by at most a finite
number of counterarguments.
3.2. Examples
We are now ready to treat some informal examples and discuss how Pollock’s formalism deals with them. Each of
the following examples begins with a small natural language conversation between a proponent (P) and an opponent
(O) of a certain statement, followed by an attempt to formalize P and O’s arguments in Pollock’s formalism.
Example 6 (classical rebut).
P: I don’t think it will rain this afternoon (¬ra). The weather is sunny now (sn), so it will probably also be like this
in the afternoon (sa).
O: But the weather forecast predicted rain (wfpr).
INPUT= {sn,wfpr}
PFREASONS= {sn⇒ sa,sa⇒ ¬ra,wfpr⇒ ra}
P: sn,sn⇒ ¬ra
O: wfpr,wfpr⇒ ra
Here, the argument of O rebuts the argument of P.
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P: It probably rained last night (rln) because the streets are wet (sw) when I opened the curtains this morning, and
I can’t think of any other reason why they would be wet.
O: The streets are wet because a water pipeline bursted last night (wpb).
INPUT= {sw,wpb}
PFREASONS= {sw⇒ rln,wpb⇒ ¬sw⇒ rnl	}
P: sw,sw⇒ rln
O: → wpb,wpb⇒ ¬sw⇒ rnl	}
Here, the argument of O undercuts the argument of P.
Example 8 (self-defeat).
P: John goes out with his friends every night (go), so he’s probably bachelor (b). He also wears a ring on his hand
(r), so he’s probably married (m). So, he is both married and not, and therefore the earth is flat (fe).
O: Give me a break. . .
INPUT= {go,r,b⊃ ¬m}
PFREASONS= {go⇒ b,r⇒ m}
P: g,g⇒ b,r,r⇒ m,b⊃ ¬m,b∧ (b ⊃ ¬m) → ¬m,m∧ ¬m→ fe
O: —
Here, P puts forward an argument that is self-defeating (it rebuts itself). In Pollock’s formalism, as well as in several
other formalisms for formal argumentation, such an argument is automatically rejected without the need for serious
counterargument (see Definition 5). The idea is that someone who contradicts himself should not be taken seriously.
Example 9 (Ajax-Feijenoord; Socratic-style undercut).
P: “There is a threat that tonight’s soccer game will lead to riots (t ), because Ajax plays against Feijenoord (af ).”
O: “Don’t worry, if there is really a threat, then the government will of course send extra police, which will then
make sure that tonight’s game no longer causes a security threat.”
INPUT= {af}
PFREASONS= {af⇒ t,t⇒ p,p⇒ ¬af⇒ t	}
P: af,af⇒ t (A1)
O: af,af⇒ t,t⇒ p,p⇒ ¬af⇒ t	 (A2)
Here, the opponent confronts the proponent with the (defeasible) consequences of his own reasoning which un-
dercuts the original argument. Thus, O’s informal argument is essentially an Socratic-style argument (the same will
hold in Examples 10–12). In Pollock’s original formalism (as well as in many others) the only way to represent this
undercutting argument is by means of a self-defeating argument, which in Pollock’s formalism (and, again, also in
many others) is automatically made “out”. The question, however, is whether the informal argument is in essence also
self-defeating. In Section 4 it will be argued that this is not the case and that Pollock’s formalism (as well as many
others) simply lacks the constructs needed to properly model this kind of arguments.
Example 10 (shipment of goods; Socratic-style rebut).
P: “The shipment of goods must have arrived in the Netherlands by now (a), because we placed an order three
months ago (tma).”
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declaration (cd), and I can’t see any such declaration in our information system (¬is).”
INPUT= {tma,¬is}
PFREASONS= {tma⇒ a,¬is⇒ ¬cd,a⇒ cd}
P: tma,tma⇒ a (A1)
O: tma,tma⇒ a,a⇒ cd,¬is,¬is⇒ ¬cd (A2)
Here, the opponent again confronts the proponent with the (defeasible) consequences of his own reasoning. This
time, the consequences are an inconsistency (cd and ¬cd). The result is again a self-defeating argument.
Example 11 (tax relief; Socratic-style rebut).
P: “Next year, we are going to get a tax-relief (tr), because our politicians promised so (pmp).”
O: “But in the current situation, you can only implement a tax-relief by accepting a significant budget deficit (bd),
which means we will also get a huge fine from Brussels (fb). There goes our tax-relief.”
INPUT= {pmp}
PFREASONS= {pmp⇒ tr,tr⇒ bd,bd⇒ fb,fb⇒ ¬tr}
P: pmp,pmp⇒ tr (A1)
O: pmp,pmp⇒ tr,tr⇒ bd,bd⇒ fb,fb⇒ ¬tr (A2)
Here, the (defeasible) consequences of proponent’s argument are again inconsistent. Notice that although Example
10 could theoretically be dealt with by allowing the controversial principle of default contraposition (which would
enable the construction of a counterargument “¬is, ¬is⇒ ¬cd, ¬cd⇒ a”) such an approach is not possible in
Example 11. Even if one allows default contraposition, all possible counterarguments will still be self-defeating, and
will therefore automatically be “out”.
3.3. Pollock’s new system
Pollock is one of the few researchers in the field of defeasible reasoning who has given special attention to the
issues related to self-defeating arguments. One particular example that is treated by Pollock is the following [16].
Example 12 (pink elephant). Robert says the elephant besides him looks pink (rselp).
The fact that Robert says the elephant looks pink is a reason to believe that it is looks pink (elp).
The fact that the elephant looks pink is a reason to believe that it is pink (eip).
Robert becomes unreliable in the presence of pink elephants (ruppe).
INPUT= {rselp,ruppe,eip∧ ruppe⊃ ¬(rselp⇒ elp)}
PFREASONS= {rselp⇒ elp,elp⇒ eip}
We can then construct the following arguments:
P: rselp,rselp⇒ elp
O: rselp,rselp ⇒ elp,elp ⇒ eip,ruppe,eip ∧ ruppe ⊃ ¬(rselp ⇒ elp),eip ∧ ruppe ∧
(eip∧ ruppe⊃ ¬(rselp⇒ elp)) → ¬(rselp⇒ elp)
The key point to notice about the above example is that it concerns a self-defeating argument that has an undercutter
that undercuts one of the rules it is based on (one could say that “the argument’s head bites its body”). In this respect,
Pollock’s pink elephant example is similar to our Ajax-Feijenoord example, although the latter is somewhat simpler.
Pollock argues that in the pink elephant example, not only eip but also elp should be prevented from becoming
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argument defeating subargument rselp,rselp⇒ elp is self-defeating, and in Pollock’s original formalism, self-
defeating arguments cannot prevent other arguments from becoming justified. How does one deal with this problem?
At first, Pollock tries to find the solution by generalizing the notion of self-defeat [16], but later he retreats from
this approach and instead tries to solve it using a multiple status assignment [18]. Prakken and Vreeswijk [21] show
that this approach basically boils down to implementing Dung’s preferred semantics [7]. Another difference is that in
Pollock’s new approach, only the last conclusion of an argument can be used to defeat arguments.
Under preferred semantics, O’s argument (Pink elephant example) is not part of any extension, since it defeats itself
and has no other defeaters. As O’s argument defeats P’s argument, the latter is also not in any preferred extension.
Thus, P’s argument cannot be ultimately undefeated, and elp neither eip is justified.
There is some controversy about whether elp should or should not be defeated outright. Prakken and Vreeswijk
argue that although eip should be defeated, elp could also be undefeated, because its only defeater is a self-defeating
argument, and eip is not a deductive consequence of elp [21]. Perhaps the best way to see why elp should be
defeated is by means of a dialogue.
P: The elephant besides Robert looks pink, because Robert says so.
O: But if the elephant looks pink, then it probably also is pink, don’t you think?
P: (cannot give any good reason for denying this inference) Euhh, yes. . .
O: But you know that Robert becomes unreliable in the presence of pink elephants, so how can you maintain
that the elephant looks pink in the first place?
P: (understands that his statement elp has lost grounds) Euhh. . .
The point is that a rational agent that beliefs elp and allows for its beliefs to be critically questioned, will soon find
out that its belief elp lacks any solid base. As this holds for any rational agent with this belief, elp should not be
justified.
Unfortunately, there also exist examples that are handled in a somewhat less intuitive way by Pollock’s new system.
Take, for instance, the tax-relief example.
Example 13 (tax relief, continued).
INPUT= {pmp}
PFREASONS= {pmp⇒ tr,tr⇒ bd,bd⇒ fb,fb⇒ ¬tr}
Here, there exists the following argument.
pmp(1),pmp⇒ tr(2),tr⇒ bd(3),bd⇒ fb(4),fb⇒ ¬bd(5)
Here, argument (1,2,3,4,5) defeats all of its subarguments that contain the prima facie reason pmp⇒ tr (including
itself), and argument (1,2) defeats argument (1,2,3,4,5). There exists only one preferred extension, which contains
argument (1,2,3,4,5) as well as all its subarguments. Thus, in Pollock’s terminology [18], pmp, tr, bd, fb are
ultimately undefeated and ¬tr is defeated outright.
The fact that in Pollock’s new system tr, bd and fb are justified means that the tax-relief problem is dealt with
in a structurally different way than the pink elephant problem, even though both of them are based on self-defeating
arguments of the type “head bites body”. Furthermore, one could describe the same kind of small conversation in
which a person is confronted with the untenability of its standpoint. Therefore, we believe both examples should be
dealt with in a uniform way.
4. Analysis
At first sight, implementing Socratic-style arguments appears to involve all kinds of difficulties related to the
handling of self-defeating arguments. However, this does not necessarily need to be the case.
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For our purposes, the most appropriate way to do so is by means of semi-formal dialogues, as these are close to how
people actually argue.
Notice that the aim of this section is not to provide a fully defined dialogue system for Socratic reasoning—although
the task of doing so may be an interesting topic for future research. Instead, the main objective of our treatment of
Socratic dialogues is to informally illustrate some of the concepts that play a role in them. This discussion then
serves as a basis for stating the principles on which a fully formal notion of Socratic-style arguments will be based
(Section 5).
In the following examples, we use the dialogue moves as has been described by [10]. To enhance the readability
of the examples, we also use an explicit “concede” statement, with a party indicates agreement with the other party.
To illustrate the workings of a dialogue system take the tax-relief example mentioned earlier. Suppose the proponent
wants to defend that there will be a tax-relief and the opponent asks for the reasons for this but does not argue against
it. Then the dialogue would look as follows:
Example 14.
P: claim tr CP (tr) “I think that tr.”
O: why tr “Why do you think so?”
P: because pmp⇒ tr CP (pmp,tr) “Because of pmp.”
O: concede tr CO(tr) “OK, you are right.”
Each move in a dialogue game consists of a speech act, like claim (for claiming a proposition), why (for questioning
a proposition), because (for supporting a proposition) or concede (for admitting a proposition endorsed by the other
party). A central notion in a dialogue system is that of a commitment. A commitment is a party’s “official” standpoint
in the dialogue, it is what the party is bound to defend when it is questioned or attacked [28].
In the above dialogue the opponent concedes the main claim, so the proponent wins the dialogue. If, during the
cause of a dialogue, parties can confront each other with the (defeasible) consequences of their opinions, then a
different dialogue may result:
Example 15.
P: claim tr CP (tr) “I think that tr.”
O: but-then tr⇒ bd CO(CP (bd)) “Then you implicitly also hold that bd.”
P: concede bd CP (tr,bd) “Yes I do.”
O: but-then bd⇒ fb CO(CP (fb))1 “Then you implicitly also hold that fb.”
P: concede fb CP (tr,bd,fb) “Yes I do.”
O: but-then fb⇒ ¬tr CO(CP (¬tr)) “Then you implicitly also hold that ¬tr.”
P: concede ¬tr CP (tr,bd,fb,¬tr) “Oops, you’re right; I caught myself in. . . ”
Here, much akin to a Socratic dialogue, the opponent wins the dialogue because it forces the proponent to commit
himself to an inconsistency.
A key feature in the above dialogue is the but-then statement, with which the opponent confronts the proponent
with the defeasible consequences of the proponent’s commitments. A but-then statement is a special form of claim,
in which the speaker does not become committed himself to the consequent of the rule being claimed applicable. In
general, in order to use a “but-then ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⇒ φ”, the other party has to be committed to ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn. The
immediate aim of a but-then statement is to commit him to φ as well. The final aim is then to get the other party to the
point where it is obvious that his commitments are inconsistent.
Notice that the immediate effect of a but-then statement is a nested commitment, as is for instance shown on
the second line of the above dialogue. Although this may appear odd at first, it is in fact the most appropriate way
to describe the effects of the but-then statement in terms of commitments. When O says: “if you endorse tr then
1 We no longer explicitly mention CO(CP (bd)) since CP (bd).
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you actually also endorse bd, don’t you?” then what is it that O becomes committed to? The first thing to notice
is that O does not necessarily endorse bd himself, so it does not hold that CO(bd). Furthermore, it goes too far to
immediately have P committed to bd; the rule “tr⇒ bd” is defeasible and P may defend himself by giving a reason
(an undercutter) why this rule does not apply (an example of this will be treated further on). Therefore, it also does
not hold that CP (bd). The only thing that can be said regarding the but-then statement is that O claims the bd is
implicitly endorsed by P. Therefore, it holds that CO(CP (bd)).
An interesting question is how the style of reasoning of the “because” statement can be compared with that of the
“but-then” statement (see also Fig. 1):
(1) With the because statement, reasoning goes backwards; the party being questioned tries to find reasons to support
its thesis. With the but-then statement, on the other hand, reasoning goes forward; the party being questioned can
be forced to make additional reasoning steps.
(2) With the because statement, the proponent of a thesis (like φ in Fig. 1) tries to find a path (or tree) from the
premises to φ (the opponent’s task is then to try to defeat this path). With the but-then statement, on the other
hand, it is the opponent of the thesis that tries to find a path (or tree).
(3) The path (or tree) constructed using because statements should ultimately originate from statements that are
accepted to be true (such as premises), whereas the path constructed using but-then statements should ultimately
lead to statements that are considered false (contradictions)
(4) With a successfully constructed because path (or tree), but the proponent and opponent become committed to the
propositions on the path, whereas with a successfully constructed but-then path (or tree), it is possible that only
the proponent becomes committed to the propositions on the path.
In the above analysis, it appears that an opponent of φ has two options: either trying to construct a but-then path
from φ, or trying to prevent the proponent from successfully constructing an undefeated because path. These strategies
can sometimes also be combined.
The use of a but-then statement does not automatically lead to a new commitment on the side of the other party.
Sometimes, it can be successfully argued why the counterparty does not have to become committed. To illustrate
why, consider again the tax-relief example, but now with the extra information that France and Germany also have a
budget deficit, and therefore have an interest in softening up the rule that a budget deficit leads to fines.2 Thus, the
rule bd⇒ fb can now be undercut.
Example 16.
P: claim tr CP (tr)
O: but-then tr⇒ bd CO(CP (bd))
P: concede bd CP (tr,bd)
O: but-then bd⇒ fb CO(CP (fb))
P: claim ¬bd⇒ fb	 CP (tr,bd,¬bd⇒ fb	)
O: why ¬bd⇒ fb	 CO(CP (fb))
P: because bd(F) ∧ bd(G) ⇒ ¬bd⇒ fb	 CP (tr,bd,¬bd⇒ fb	,bd(F) ∧ bd(G))
O: retract CP (fb), concede tr CO(tr)
Here, the opponent again tries to construct a successful but-then path. This path, however, is undercut by the
proponent. What happens next depends on the nature of the dialogue. When backtracking is allowed, the opponent
may pursue another strategy. When backtracking is not allowed, the opponent loses the game.
2 And as everybody knows, France and Germany usually get their way in the EU. . .
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be made:
(1) A but-then statement is in essence a special form of a claim statement. A claim statement has as effect that a new
commitment comes into existence, and such should also be the case for a but-then statement.
(2) But-then statements do not in general create unnested commitments (at least, not immediately). Suppose party O
utters “but-then ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⇒ φ”. This does of course not mean that O becomes committed to φ (so we do not
have CO(φ). It also does not mean that P is actually committed to φ (that is, we don’t automatically have CP (φ)),
because P may avoid commitment by successfully defending ψi (1  i m) The only thing that can be said is
that O feels that P is implicitly committed to φ (so CO(CP (φ))), but whether P is actually committed to φ is still
open for discussion.
(3) In general, the party that makes a claim bears the responsibility of defending this claim. For instance, if P utters
“claim φ” then upon P rests the task of defending φ. Similarly, if O utters “but-then ϕi ∧· · ·∧ϕn ⇒ φ” then upon
O rests the task of defending CP (φ) by making sure that P cannot avoid the conclusion φ. If O is unable to do so,
it can loose the dialogue game.
To summarise: nested commitment is quite a natural concept to use in dialogues to enable parties to be confronted
with the consequences of their own commitments.
As an aside, it may be interesting to compare the but-then statement with the resolve statement of MacKenzie’s DC
[10]. In DC, if party A claims proposition q (“claim q”), which is then questioned (“why q”) by party B, and party
B is committed to p, from which q directly follows, then party A may utter “resolve p ⊃ q”, which forces party B to
become committed to q as well (or alternatively, B may retract its commitment to p).3 See the following example.
P: claim p CP (p)
O: concede p CO(p)
P: claim p ⊃ q CP (p,p ⊃ q)
O: concede p ⊃ q CO(p,p ⊃ q)
P: claim q CP (p,p ⊃ q, q)
O: why q [unchanged]
P: resolve “If p ∧ (p ⊃ q) then q” [unchanged]
O: concede q CO(p,p ⊃ q, q)
One obvious difference between the resolve and the but-then statement is that after a successful resolve statement
both parties are committed to the proposition in question, whereas with a successful but-then statement it is possible
that only one party becomes committed. Furthermore, the but-then statement also has an inherently defeasible nature;
it is possible that the other party has a reason (exception) against applying the rule in question. This reason can then
be discussed in the remainder of the dialogue. In short, although the resolve statement can be sufficient for classical,
monotonic reasoning, for defeasible reasoning it is desirable to have a statement that has special, nonmonotonic
properties. We think that the but-then statement fulfills this requirement.
There also exists an interesting difference between the but-then statement and the claim statement. In theory, it
would be possible to replace a statement “but-then tr ⇒ bd” by “claim tr ⊃ bd” (for instance in Example 15)
and then question the other party regarding bd. The difference, however, is that of burden of proof. With a claim
statement, the burden of proof is on the party issuing the claim, whereas with a but-then statement, it is the other party
who is responsible to give explicit reasons why the rule in question would not be applicable to the current situation.
In Example 15, this would mean that the proponent would have to come up with reasons against the applicability
of tr ⇒ bd, if he/she wants to avoid becoming committed to bd. This is quite different from the situation where
tr ⊃ bd would simply be claimed, given all kinds of possibilities to contest this claim. The but-then statement is
most appropriate in the case of a (defeasible) rule whose general applicability is held by both the proponent and the
opponent.
3 Another use of MacKenzie’s resolve statement is to notice the other party that its commitments are inconsistent, thus forcing the other party to
retract one or more of them.
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The treatment of the but-then statement and the notion of nested commitments is interesting not only because these
are issues worthwhile of a treatment in itself, but also because they can shed new light on the issue of self-defeat.
Recall that in Section 3.1 Socratic-style arguments were represented as self-defeating arguments. The discussion
above, however, gives reason to believe that this may not be the right approach. Our point is not so much based on the
technical difficulties related to self-defeating arguments, but is an intuitive one: the Socratic-style counterarguments,
as they occur in actual human-to-human conversations, are essentially not self-defeating.
To see why this is, consider again the tax-relief dialogue (Example 15) and ask oneself the question: does O
contradict himself? Although O manages to let P commit himself to a contradiction, O itself is not at any moment
committed to an inconsistency. It merely confronts P with the consequences of its own reasoning without endorsing
these consequences himself.
More general, consider the case of a critical interview. The interviewer may question his guest into the direction
of an inconsistency without endorsing this inconsistency himself. Or consider Socrates, who proclaimed to have no
knowledge at all. During the discussions with his fellow citizens he was rarely reported to take any position himself.
It were his discussion partners who committed themselves to inconsistencies, not Socrates himself.
It is therefore our view that, if Socratic-style reasoning is to be modelled by formal argumentation, the resulting
Socratic-style arguments should not be self-defeating.
4.2. Principles of S-arguments
A Socratic-style argument (S-argument) can preliminary be defined as an argument that illustrates the problematic
nature of another argument by assuming one or more of the other argument’s conclusions. An example argument
discourse featuring an S-argument is the following:
Example 17 (shipment of goods, continued).
P: tma,tma⇒ a
O: ¬is,¬is⇒ ¬cd,a,a⇒ cd
Another example of such an argument-game is the following:
Example 18 (Ajax-Feijenoord, continued).
P: af,af⇒ t
O: t,t⇒ p,p⇒ ¬af⇒ t	
A foreign commitment of an S-argument is a proposition that is a conclusion of another argument that is used
as an assumption in the S-argument. Foreign commitments are called like that because they are based on the actual
commitments in the other arguments.
In Example 17, proposition a in O’s argument is a foreign commitment that has its origin in P’s argument. In
Example 18, proposition t in O’s argument is a foreign commitment that has its origin in P’s argument.
A conclusion of an argument is fc-based iff it is based on one or more foreign commitments. For instance, in
Example 17 O’s proposition cd is fc-based, while O’s proposition ¬cd is not fc-based. We use the convention of
representing fc-based proposition in gray.
Notice that the proposed principles for formalizing S-arguments do not allow for an unlimited depth of nesting of
commitments. That is, we do not allow utterances like “I endorse that you endorse that I endorse. . . ”. These constructs
are rarely seen in actual discussions and in our view not worthwhile the effort of overcoming the technical difficulties
associated with them (see [4] for a discussion). We will therefore limit the depth of nested commitments to at most two.
This can be implemented by requiring that every foreign commitment has its origin in another argument’s conclusion
that is itself not fc-based.
With respect to the above discussion, the following general principles regarding S-arguments can be stated:
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All foreign commitments should have their origin in conclusions (of the other argument) that are themselves not
fc-based.
(2) An S-argument A2 S-rebuts an argument A1 if
(a) all foreign commitments of A2 have their origin in A1
(b) A2 contains conflicting conclusions, of which at least one conclusion is fc-based.
(3) An S-argument A2 S-undercuts an argument A1 if
(a) all foreign commitments of A2 have their origin in A1
(b) A2 contains an fc-based conclusion that undercuts some rule in A1.
5. Formalization
As shown in [4], S-arguments can be implemented in various formalisms for defeasible reasoning, including an
argument-theoretic version of default logic [22] and the formalism of Prakken and Sartor [20]. In order to keep things
concise we will, however, restrict ourselves to the formalism of Pollock.
As for the system of Pollock, the first thing to notice is that S-arguments are in fact based on a specific kind of
suppositional reasoning. With an S-argument one supposes one or more of the commitments of the other party in order
to derive something that undermines the other party’s position (either a contradiction or an undercutter of the other
party’s original argument). Unfortunately, this particular form of suppositional reasoning is not supported in Pollock’s
framework for defeasible reasoning. This can be illustrated using the following example.
Example 19.
INPUT= {p,¬r}
PFREASONS = {p ⇒ q, q ⇒ r}
There now exists an argument for q (argument I):
1. 〈∅,p,∞〉 (p ∈ INPUT)
2. 〈∅, q,α〉 (p is a prima facie reason for q).
An S-argument would then suppose q and derive a contradiction (argument II).
1. 〈{q}, q,∞〉 (supposition)
2. 〈{q}, r, α〉 (q is a prima facie reason for r)
3. 〈∅,¬r,∞〉 (¬r ∈ INPUT).
Argument II, however, is self-defeating and does not prevent argument I from becoming justified, neither in Pollock’s
old system, nor in Pollock’s new system.
So, even though Pollock’s system supports suppositional reasoning, it does not support the specific suppositional
reasoning required for S-arguments. It is clear that in order to allow for S-arguments, Pollock’s framework needs to
be extended.
In order to incorporate S-arguments in Pollock’s framework, one of the things that is needed is the ability to repre-
sent foreign commitments, as well as a mechanism to determine whether a certain conclusion is fc-based or not. An
obvious choice would be to use the facilities for suppositional reasoning for this. The precise definitions of supposi-
tional reasoning would then have to be adjusted to suit the special requirements of Socratic-style argumentation. In
order to keep things simple and to keep focus on our main point, we assume that all classical (non S) arguments are
linear, thus limiting suppositional reasoning to S-arguments only.
A general principle of the now coming formalization is that each line only contains the suppositions (foreign
commitments) that it is actually based on. For this, it is necessary to deviate from Pollock’s original definition of an
argument. First of all, the input rule should produce a line with an empty supposition, the foreign commitment rule
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of the lines they use. For the application of conclusive reasons we require that the entire antecedent is actually needed
to support the consequent.
Another design consideration is that the foreign commitments are conclusions of the argument being attacked.
Furthermore, the conclusions on which the foreign commitments are based should themselves not be based on foreign
commitments.
Definition 20. An argument based on INPUT is a finite sequence σ1, . . . , σn, where each σi is a line of argument.
A line of argument is a triple 〈Xi,pi, νi〉, where Xi is the set of foreign commitments of σi , pi is a proposition, and
νi is the degree of justification of σi . A new line of argument is obtained from earlier lines of argument according to
the following rules of argument formation.
Input. If p is in INPUT then it holds that σ, 〈∅,p,∞〉 is an argument.
Prima facie reason. If σ is an argument, 〈X1,p1, η1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn, ηn〉 are members of σ and {p1, . . . , pn} is a reason
of strength ν for q , then σ, 〈X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xn,q,min{η1, . . . ηn, ν}〉 is an argument.
Conclusive reason. If σ is an argument, 〈X1,p1, η1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn, ηn〉 are members of σ obtained by any rule of
argument formation except conclusive reason, {p1, . . . , pn} is a conclusive reason for q , and for any pi ∈
{p1, . . . , pn} : {p1, . . . , pn}−{pi} is not a conclusive reason for q , then σ, 〈X1 ∪· · ·∪Xn,q,min{η1, . . . , ηn}〉
is an argument.
Foreign commitment. If σ is an argument and p is a proposition, then σ, 〈{p},p,∞〉 is also an argument.
To avoid redundancy, we require that different lines always have different propositions.
Definition 21. An argument σ classically rebuts an argument η iff:
(1) η contains a line of the form 〈∅, q,α〉 that is obtained by the argument formation rule prima facie reason from
some earlier lines 〈∅,p1, α1〉, . . . , 〈∅,pn,αn〉 where {p1, . . . , pn} is a prima facie reason for q , and
(2) σ contains a line of the form 〈∅,¬q,β〉 where β  α.
Definition 22. An argument σ classically undercuts an argument η iff:
(1) η contains a line of the form 〈X,q,α〉 that is obtained by the argument formation rule reason from some earlier
lines 〈X1,p1, α1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn,αn〉 where {p1, . . . , pn} is a prima facie reason for q , and
(2) σ contains a line of the form 〈∅,¬{p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	, β〉 where β  α.
Definition 23. An argument σ S-rebuts an argument η iff:
(1) σ contains a line of the form 〈X1,L,β1〉 and a line of the form 〈X2,¬L,β2〉 where X1 = ∅ or X2 = ∅, and
(2) for each fi ∈ X1 ∪ X2 it holds that there is a line in η of the form 〈∅, fi, αi〉, and
(3) it holds that min{β1, β2}min{α1, . . . , αn}.
If argument σ S-rebuts argument η and min{β1, βn} = min{α1, . . . , αn} then η reverse S-rebuts σ .
The notion of reverse S-rebuttal in Definition 23 has been introduced to make S-rebutting symmetrical in the case
of equal argument-strengths. This makes it similar to classical rebutting, which is also symmetrical when argument-
strengths are equal.
Definition 24. An argument σ S-undercuts an argument η iff:
(1) η contains a line of the form 〈X,q,α〉 that is obtained by the argument formation rule prima facie reason from
some earlier lines 〈X1,p1, α1〉, . . . , 〈Xn,pn,αn〉 where {p1, . . . , pn} is a prima facie reason for q , and
(2) σ contains a line of the form 〈Y,¬{p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	, β〉 with Y = ∅, and
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(4) it holds that β min{α1, . . . , αn}.
Definition 25. An argument σ defeats an argument η iff:
(1) σ classically rebuts η, or
(2) σ classically undercuts η, or
(3) σ S-rebuts η, or
(4) σ reverse S-rebuts η, or
(5) σ S-undercuts η.
The formalism of Definitions 20–25 will be referred to as the S-enriched Pollock system.
It must be noticed that if one restricts oneself to linear arguments without foreign commitments, the S-enriched
Pollock system is equivalent to Pollock’s old system with linear arguments only. This can be seen as follows. First,
if no foreign commitments are allowed then the remaining arguments are all linear (see Definition 20). Also, without
foreign commitments, arguments cannot S-rebut, reverse S-rebut or S-undercut each other. Thus, on the level of a
Dung-style argumentation framework, what the above definitions do is that they take the existing set of arguments and
the defeat-relation, and add new arguments (S-arguments) and extend the defeat-relation. In this way, the S-enriched
set of arguments and defeat relation are each a superset of the original set of arguments and defeat relation (more on
this in Section 6).
5.1. Examples
In order to see how the S-enriched system works, consider the following examples.
Example 26 (Ajax-Feijenoord, continued).
INPUT= {af}
PFREASONS= {af⇒ t,t⇒ p,p⇒ ¬af⇒ t	}
P: af,af⇒ t
O: t,t⇒ p,p⇒ ¬af⇒ t	
Here, argument con is an undercutting S-argument against argument pro.
Example 27 (tax-relief, continued).
INPUT= {pmp}
PFREASONS= {pmp⇒ tr,tr⇒ bd,bd⇒ fb,fb⇒ ¬tr}
P: pmp,pmp⇒ tr
O: tr,tr⇒ bd,bd⇒ fb,fb⇒ ¬tr
Here, the argument con is a rebutting S-argument against the argument pro.
6. Semantical issues
It is interesting to examine how the notion of S-arguments fits into Dung’s abstract argumentation theory [7].
A Dung-style argumentation framework consists of a pair (Args,def ) where Args is a set of arguments and def is a
defeat relation between the arguments. We write A2defA1 (A2 defeats A1) when (A2,A1) ∈ def . Based on the notion
of an argument framework, Dung defines several principles (“semantics”) for determining whether an argument is
overall justified. In this section we will focus on grounded semantics.
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To illustrate the working of an argumentation framework, consider the following example.
INPUT= {A}
PFREASONS= {A⇒ B,B⇒ ¬A,A⇒ C}
Now, if we assume a formalism whose arguments and defeat relation are purely classical,4 this results in an argu-
mentation framework containing arguments for each combination of prima facie reasons (we leave out arguments
consisting of the same rules applied in different order).
Arguments:
(A1) A
(A2) A,A⇒ B
(A3) A,A⇒ C
(A4) A,A⇒ B,B⇒ ¬A
(A5) A,A⇒ B,A⇒ C
(A6) A,A⇒ B,B⇒ ¬A,A⇒ C
Defeat relation:
A4defA1, A4defA2, A4defA3, A4defA4, A4defA5, A4defA6
A6defA1, A6defA2, A6defA3, A6defA4, A6defA5, A6defA6
This argumentation framework is graphically depicted in Fig. 2.
Now, if the argumentation formalism is changed to include S-arguments, then this introduces a new class of argu-
ments. Basically, one can now construct S-arguments that include foreign commitments from the classical arguments
(as is stated in Definition 23. In the above example, some of these new arguments are:
(A7) B,B⇒ ¬A,A
(A8) B,B⇒ ¬A,A
(A9) ¬A,A
(A10) ¬A,A
With the new arguments, the defeat relation is also extended:
A2defA7, A4defA7, A6defA7, A5defA7
A7defA2, A7defA4, A7defA6, A7defA5
A2defA8, A4defA8, A6defA8, A5defA8
A8defA2, A8defA4, A8defA6, A8defA5
A4defA9, A6defA9
A4defA10, A6defA10
4 For simplicity, we do not yet take any conclusive reasons into account in this example.
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The new S-enriched argumentation framework is depicted in Fig. 3.
Thus, one can see that the concept of S-arguments is compatible with the notion of a Dung-style argumentation
framework. Essentially, what happens is that both the set of arguments and the defeat relation among these arguments
are extended. The extension is done in such a way that if one would leave out the S-arguments, as well as each
instance of the defeat relation involving at least one S-argument, the result would be an argumentation framework of
an argumentation formalism that allows only classical arguments and classical defeat.
6.1. S-arguments and the notion of justified arguments
Given an argumentation framework, the next step is to determine which arguments are considered justified. As our
aim is to stay relatively close to Pollock’s original system, we assume grounded semantics, which can be summarized
as follows.
Definition 28. Let AF = (Args,def ) be an argumentation framework in which every argument is defeated by at most
a finite number of arguments. Consider the following sequence of sets of arguments:
• F 0 = ∅
• F i+1 = {A ∈ Args | for each B ∈ Args such that BdefA there exists a C ∈ F i such that CdefB}
An argument is justified under grounded semantics iff it is in⋃∞i=0(F i).
This definition can be applied on Fig. 2 as follows.
F 0 = ∅
F 1 = {A ∈ Args | A is acceptable with respect to ∅}
= {A ∈ Args | A has no arguments defeating it}
= {A1,A2,A3,A5}
F 2 = {A ∈ Args | A is acceptable with respect to F 1}
= {A ∈ Args | every argument defeating A is defeated by {A1,A2,A3,A5}}
= {A1,A2,A3,A5,A6}
F i+1 = F i (with i  2)
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i=0 = {A1,A2,A3,A5}, so A1, A2, A3 and A5 are considered justified under grounded seman-
tics.
If we look at the S-enriched formalism, on the other hand, then a different outcome results. Intuitively, with S-
arguments, only A and C should become justified, since the argument for ¬A (A,A⇒ B,B⇒ ¬A) is incoherent and
the argument for B (A,A⇒ B) has a S-counterargument (B,B⇒ ¬A,A).
It is interesting to examine what happens when grounded semantics is applied straightforwardly to the S-enriched
argumentation framework of Fig. 3.
F 0 = ∅
F 1 = {A ∈ Args | A is acceptable with respect to ∅}
= {A ∈ Args | A has no arguments defeating it}
= {A1,A3,A9,A10}
F 2 = {A ∈ Args | A is acceptable with respect to F 1}
= {A ∈ Args | every argument defeating A is defeated by {A1,A3,A9,A10}}
= {A1,A3,A9,A10}
F i+1 = F i (with i  2)
At least, this result is partly in line with what one expects. A2 and A5 are not justified anymore because they now have
S-counterarguments against them. A1 and A3, on the other hand, remain justified, as is desired. This result, however,
comes with a price, since not only A1 and A3, but also the S-arguments A9 and A10 become justified. Worse yet, if
one would just take the conclusions of justified arguments (where the conclusions are simply all propositions derived
in the argument, as is for instance the approach in [20]) then from ¬A,A being a justified argument, it would follow
that both A and ¬A would become justified conclusions!
Applying (grounded) semantics to an S-enriched argumentation framework therefore involves two problems: (1)
S-arguments that can become justified and (2) the conclusions of S-arguments that can become justified.
Let us first consider the point that S-arguments can become justified. In the examples in Section 5.1 and elsewhere,
we saw that S-arguments are meant as counterarguments. That is, they are not meant to yield conclusions on their
own, but instead to prevent other conclusions from becoming justified. An S-argument is context-dependent; it needs
an argument that it defeats. One can say that an S-argument does not have a meaning when standing on its own.
A dialogue, for example, provides a proper environment for S-arguments to make sense. The semantics as stated
by Dung, on the other hand, treat arguments as having an existence that is independent from any other argument.
Dung’s semantics tries to answer the question “Is S-argument A justified?”, but this question does not make any
sense if one considers that S-arguments cannot stand on their own. It is simply not applicable to call S-arguments
“justified”, “defeated” or “defensible”, as these terms are applicable to classical arguments only. A possible solution
would therefore be to reserve the terms “justified”, “defeated” or “defensible” only to classical arguments, while
leaving the rest of the specification of grounded semantics unchanged.
The second point to consider is that of justified conclusions. If our ultimate interest is in the justified conclusions,
and we regard arguments only as a technical intermediate step to yield these conclusions, than in a certain sense it
does not matter which arguments are justified and which are not, a long as we have the “right” justified conclusions.
If we apply the notions of justified arguments as in Definition 28 without any changes, then there are two alternatives
for defining when a conclusion is justified or not.
As the grounded extension is always conflict-free, it can easily be seen that the set of conclusions of classical
arguments is always consistent. An obvious choice would therefore to take only the conclusions of the classical
justified arguments as justified.
Definition 29. A formula is justified iff it is a conclusion of a classical argument (that is, an argument without foreign
commitments) that is justified under grounded semantics.
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One particular subtle issue in formal argumentation is that of self-defeat. In Pollock’s old system, self-defeating
arguments are automatically rejected and cannot influence the status of other arguments (Definition 5). One of the
reasons for this is informal: someone who contradicts himself should not be taken serious and should not be able to
keep other arguments from becoming justified.
There also exists, however, a technical reason for “neutralizing” the effects of self-defeating arguments. Consider
the following example.
Example 30.
INPUT= {A,B,C}
PFREASONS= {A⇒ D,B⇒ ¬D,C⇒ E}
There now exists an argument against E:
A,A⇒ D,B⇒ ¬D,D∧ ¬D→ ¬E
The interaction in Pollock’s old system between the arguments for D, ¬D, ¬E and E is shown in Fig. 4. The
argument for ¬E now prevents E from becoming justified, even though intuitively E has nothing to do with the
conflict between D and ¬D.
The point is that, when one allows self-defeating arguments in combination with first-order conclusive reasoning,
it is possible to combine two arguments that rebut each other into an argument that can defeat any arbitrary argu-
ment. This is especially problematic when grounded semantics is being applied (like in Pollock’s old system), since
the grounded extension would be empty. As is explained in [5], this situation is somewhat better in Pollock’s new
(preferred semantics based) formalism, but is still not completely solved by it.
The approach of ruling out self-defeating arguments or neutralizing their effects is not just taken in Pollock’s
system, but also in a wide range of other formalisms for defeasible argumentation [3,9,20]. It is therefore interesting
to examine how S-arguments deal with the issue of self-defeat.
The first thing to notice is that in our S-enhanced formalism, self-defeat is limited to classical rebutting and classical
undercutting.
Lemma 31. For each argument σ in the S-enriched Pollock system such that σ defeats itself, it holds that σ classically
rebuts itself or σ classically undercuts itself.
Proof. The fact that σ defeats σ means (Definition 25) that either σ classically rebuts itself, σ classically undercuts
itself, σ S-rebuts itself, σ reverse S-rebuts itself, or σ S-undercuts itself.
Suppose σ S-undercuts itself. Then (Definition 24(1)) σ contains a line of the form 〈Y,¬{p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	, β〉
with Y = ∅. Then (Definition 24(2)), σ also contains at least one line 〈{fi}, fi,∞〉 for some fi ∈ Y . But Defini-
tion 24(3) also requires that σ contains a line 〈∅, fi, αi〉. This, however, conflicts with the definition of an argument
(Definition 20), where it is required that different lines have different propositions. Contradiction.
Fig. 4.
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reverse S-rebut itself). Thus, the only remaining possibilities are that σ classically rebuts itself, or that σ classically
undercuts itself. 
The fact that self-defeat is limited to classical arguments means that every self-defeating argument is defeated by
an argument that is itself undefeated, as is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 32. If an argument σ in the S-enriched Pollock system defeats itself, then there exists an argument η that
defeats σ and is not defeated by any argument.
Proof. Let σ be an argument such that σ defeats itself. Then, according to Lemma 31, σ either classically rebuts itself
or classically undercuts itself. If σ classically rebuts itself then (Definition 21) σ contains a line 〈∅, q,α〉 and a line
〈∅,¬q,β〉. Then the argument η = (〈{q}, q,∞〉, 〈{¬q},¬q,∞〉) S-rebuts σ and is not defeated by any argument. If
σ classically undercuts itself, then (Definition 22) σ contains a line of the form 〈∅,¬{p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	, β〉. Then
the one-line argument η = (〈{¬{p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	, β},¬{p1, . . . , pn} ⇒ q	, α〉) S-undercuts σ and is not defeated
by any argument. 
Now again consider the criterion for determining the justified arguments. In Definition 5, self-defeating arguments
were explicitly ruled out, so that they do not prevent other arguments from becoming justified. It is interesting to see
that with S-arguments, it is no longer needed to rule out self-defeating arguments in order to neutralize their effects.
Let us assume that in Definition 5 all arguments are in at level 0 (including any self-defeating arguments). Now
suppose σ is a self-defeating argument. Then, according to Theorem 32, there exists an argument η that defeats σ and
is itself undefeated. The fact that η is not defeated by any argument means that η is in at every level. This, however,
also means that σ is out and stays out at every level starting from level 1, and will thus not keep other arguments from
becoming justified.
The point is that with S-arguments, there is no need for a “hacked” version of grounded semantics (like Defini-
tion 5) or for Pollock’s new system, at least not in order to neutralize the effects of self-defeating arguments. With
S-arguments, ordinary grounded semantics (as, for instance, stated in Definition 28) will do fine.
8. Summary and conclusions
Overall, one can say that Socratic-style argumentation has been known since antiquity and is still in use today in
philosophic as well as in everyday reasoning. Today’s generation of formalisms for defeasible reasoning, however,
does not support this kind of arguments. This has been shown to be true for Pollock’s formalism (as shown in this
paper) but can also be illustrated using default logic [22] or the formalism of Prakken and Sartor [20] (as shown in
[4]).
The approach of modelling Socratic-style arguments by self-defeating arguments is undesirable both from techni-
cal and intuitive perspective. The technical problems of using self-defeating arguments are best illustrated by Fig. 4.
From a conceptual perspective, the modelling of Socratic-style arguments by self-defeating arguments is undesirable
because S-arguments are essentially not self-defeating. This is best understood by studying Socratic-style argumen-
tation in terms of (nested) commitments (Section 4). S-arguments can, however, play a role in “neutralizing” the
undesirable effects of real self-defeating arguments, as shown by Theorem 32.
The notion of S-arguments can be embedded in the argumentation formalism of John Pollock, as well as in other
ones (see [4]). On the level of a Dung-style argumentation framework the introduction of Socratic-style argumentation
amounts to extending the set of arguments as well as extending the defeat relation to include these arguments. When
determining justified conclusions from the justified arguments, however, one then has to be careful only to include
conclusions of classical arguments.
8.1. Related research
Although the concept of Socratic-style reasoning is ubiquitous in informal argumentation, it has until now received
surprisingly little attention from a formal perspective. One exception is the work of Joseph Fulda [8], in which attention
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evidence given by the witness during direct examination”. The idea is that by asking a carefully selected series of
questions, the witness can be led to commit himself to an inconsistency,5 thereby undermining his credibility.
8.2. Future research
A possible interesting research topic would be the construction of a dialogue system for Socratic-style reasoning.
Such a dialogue system would then make use of the but-then statement and the concept of nested commitments. One
particular problem that needs to be dealt with, however, is that of the relevance of dialogue moves. This problem in
fact also occurs in informal dialogue. When, in an Anglo-Saxon legal system, a lawyer cross-examines a witness it
is sometimes not immediately clear what the point is that he or she wants to make. In that case, the counterparty can
object at which the lawyer may have to explain privately to the judge his question technique as well as the relevance of
it. As the problem of relevance plays a role in real-life dialogue and argumentation it should not come as a surprise to
encounter the same problem when attempting to formalize this kind of dialogue. Joseph Fulda encounters basically the
same problem when trying to determine a criterion that allows one to distinguish between those cross-examinations
that are “to the point” and those that are not [8]. Fulda concludes that this is only possible if the future part of the
line of questioning is also taken into account. It thus seems that one possible way to deal with this issue is to have a
third party to whom such a future line of questions (or a future line of but-then statements) could be entrusted, and
who would then determine whether the questioner’s dialogue steps can still be considered as relevant. The role of this
third party would be comparable to that of a judge in informal cross-examinations. The question of how such should
be concretely implemented is an issue still open for future research.
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